Technology of anonymous networks

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Havrysh B. M., Tymchenko O. V., Борзов Ю. О., Kobevko A. T. № 2 (65) 42-56 Image Image

This paper is an overview of currently used anonymous networks based on technology of onion routing and peer-to-peer networking. It describes key features of the networks and their comparative characteristics. The main purpose of every anonymous network is to protect the information from the adversaries and provide users with a great level of anonymity. All networks can be clustered on two classes: onion routing and its modifications and plain-old peer-to-peer networks. In the first class, the major participant is Tor, which is based on the second generation of onion routing. On the other hand, P2P networks can be divided on 2 classes: traditional peer-to-peer and friend-to-friend. Friend-to-friend is a type of routing where users connect only to those users, who are considered as friends. The first class of peer-to-peer networks contains: Tarzan, MorphMix, Freenet, I2P, Netsukuku. The second class is represented by such networks as: Turtle, RetroShare. Current paper is focused only on those networks, which are successful on practice, or have strong impact on anonymous systems. Nowadays users have a wide spectre of different solutions which can be used for protecting anonymity on the Internet. Anonymous networks differ by architectures, routing types and target audiences. Unfortunately, there is no any solution, which guarantees 100 % defence from adversaries. Every technology has its own weaknesses and vulnerabilities, allowing an attacker to somehow deanonimize a particular user.

It is clear why cybercriminals need such networks, but why do ordinary people need them? The most obvious reason for using tools for anonymization in the network is to prevent the possibility of advertising companies tracking users in the network, gaining access to blocked network resources. Governments use anonymous networks for intelligence and surveillance, and people in countries deprived of free speech use them to communicate with each other.

The relevance of the study of anonymous networks is caused by the need to develop methods of de-anonymization and attacks on such networks, since these networks are widely used by terrorists and sellers of illegal goods. Governments of various countries use both technical mechanisms to counteract the anonymity of networks, financing cyber security programs, and legal

Keywords: anonymous networks, onion routing, peer-to-peer, layered encryption, invisible internet, overlay networks.

doi: 10.32403/1998-6912-2022-2-65-42-56


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